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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a two server system
serving heterogeneous customers. One of the server has a FIFO
scheduling policy and charges a fixed admission price to each
customer. The second queue follows the highest-bidder-first
(HBF) policy where an arriving customer bids for its position
in the queue. Customers make an individually optimal choice of
the server and for such system, we characterize the equilibrium
routing of customers. We specifically show that this routing is
characterized by two thresholds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two make-to-order firms manufacturing an identi-
cal product. Upon receiving an order, the firms must assemble
the product and deliver it to the customer ordering it. Each firm
can assemble only one quantity at a time and the time taken
to assemble the product need not be deterministic. During an
assembly of a product, if there are more orders being placed
by other customers, then these orders have to be fulfilled by
the firm by suitably scheduling the subsequent orders. The two
firms differ in their pricing strategy and the scheduling policy
for choosing subsequent orders. One of the firm charges a
fixed admission price for the product and maintains a FIFO
scheduling discipline. The second firm employs a bidding
policy where subsequent customers place a bid and their queue
position in the schedule in proportional to the bid placed.
The customers ordering the product differ in their cost for
unit delay and are thus sensitive to the delay in receiving the
product. When placing an order, the customer does not know
the number of pending orders but may be informed about the
service rate and the arrival rate for the orders. When ordering
the product, the customers have to decide which firm to choose
and if they choose the bidding firm, then what is the optimal
bid to be made such that the cost of obtaining the product
(the sum of the monetary and the delay cost) is minimized.
Motivated by this problem, our interest is to characterize the
equilibrium choice of the firm made by the heterogeneous
customers.
Applicable to more general setting, a formal description of
the problem considered in this paper is as follows. Consider a
two server service system with customers arriving according to
a homogeneous Poisson process. The customers are heteroge-
neous in their cost for unit delay. The service system consists
of two servers and the customers are required to obtain service
at one of these two servers. There is no dispatcher available
to route the customers and hence each arriving customer has
to make an individually optimal queue join decision. Each
server in the service system has an associated queue and the
two queues differ from each other in their scheduling policy.
One of the queue has the standard FIFO scheduling policy and
to monetize the offered service, it charges a fixed admission
price to its customers. The other queue has a non-preemptive
priority scheduling discipline where after the current service
completion, a customer with the highest priority level is next
chosen for service from the pool of customers waiting in the
queue. The priority of a customer in this queue is determined
by the bid paid by each arriving customer. Naturally, a higher
bid corresponds to a higher priority in the queue. Such a
scheduling policy is also known as the highest-bidder-first
(HBF) policy and was introduced by Kleinrock [1]. In this
paper, our primary interest is to characterize the equilibrium
routing satisfying the Wardrop conditions [2] and determine
the bidding decision made by those customers choosing the
HBF server.
Such a system with parallel HBF and FIFO services was
first analyzed in [3]. To investigate the effect on the revenue
from an HBF server, a free FIFO service was introduced in the
system. Further a minimum bid was made mandatory for those
choosing the HBF server. For such a system, the equilibrium
routing and bidding strategy was first analyzed in [3]. It was
shown that the Wardrop equilibrium routing is characterized by
a single threshold and customers with delay sensitivity (cost
per unit delay) above the threshold choose the HBF server
while the rest choose the FIFO server. Two scenarios were
considered for modeling the system; in the first scenario, a free
FIFO server was added in parallel to an existing HBF server.
In the second scenario, the total service capacity was shared
between the HBF and the FIFO server. Assuming that the
customers cannot balk, it was shown that an addition of a free
FIFO server decreases the system revenue. On the contrary,
with the help of numerical examples, it was conjectured that
sharing capacity with a FIFO server improves the revenue from
the HBF server.
The primary difference between the system model consid-
ered in this paper and that of [3] is as follows. We assume
that the FIFO server is not free but in fact comes with
an admission price. This assumption makes the model more
naturally applicable to a variety of revenue based service
systems such as the above example for make-to-order firms.
We relax the assumption of a minimum bid and analyze the
equilibrium routing and bidding rule for this problem. As in
[3], the equilibrium bids in the HBF server (by those choosing
HBF under equilibrium routing) can be determined from the
analysis in [4], [5]. We begin by analyzing whether a single
threshold routing function as in [3] satisfies the equilibrium
2routing conditions. To our surprise, this is not the case. We
then check for the threshold routing where customers with
sensitivity above a threshold choose the FIFO server while the
rest choose the HBF server. We show that such a candidate for
equilibrium routing also does not satisfy the necessary condi-
tions for Wardrop equilibrium. In our main result, we prove
that the (Wardrop) equilibrium routing is of the following
type: there exists two threshold and customers with sensitivity
between the two thresholds choose the FIFO server while the
rest choose the HBF server. To the best of our knowledge,
the result is novel and has a useful insight. While the ‘middle
class’ of the population (based on their sensitivities) choose
the FIFO service, the remaining customers (specifically those
with high and low delay sensitivity) choose the HBF server.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we shall introduce the notation and recall some
preliminary results from [3]. We prove our main results in
Section III and this is followed by a discussion summarizing
the results.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shall introduce the basic notation and
recall some preliminary results from [3]. We assume as in [3]
that the customers arrive to the service system according to
a homogeneous Poisson process of rate λ. Service times of
customers are i.i.d. random variables with distribution G(·)
and unit mean. Each arriving customer has an associated
parameter β which is a realization of the random variable β,
0 ≤ a ≤ β ≤ b < ∞. β represents a customers cost per unit
delay. Let F (β) denote the distribution of β which is assumed
to be absolutely continuous in (a, b). We also call β as the
type of the customer and call F (β) as the type profile.
The first server uses the non preemptive HBF discipline and
serves at rate µ1. The second server uses the FIFO discipline
and serves at rate µ2. Customers choosing the HBF server
will have to place a bid before joining its queue while those
choosing the FIFO server have to pay a fixed admission price
denoted by c. We will assume that all arrivals will have to
receive service from one of the two servers and they cannot
balk. Thus an arriving customer now has to make the following
decisions on arrival; which server to use, and, if it chooses the
HBF server, then the value of its bid. As in [3], we assume
oblivious decisions and let p(β) : [a, b] → [0, 1] denote the
probability that a customer of type β chooses the FIFO server.
Further, let X(β) be the equilibrium bid if such a customer
chooses the HBF server. For a preliminary analysis of the
HBF queue, refer [1]. Lui [5] and Glazer and Hassin [4] were
the first to consider the case with heterogeneous customers
(characterized by β) and have determined the equilibrium
bidding function X(β). The function X(β) determines the
optimal value of that bid to be made by a customer of type β
such that the sum of the bid and the expected waiting cost in
the queue is minimized. Specifically, it was shown that X(β)
is given by
X(β) =
∫ β
0
2ρW0y
(1− ρ+ ρF (y))
3 dF (y) (1)
HBF FIFO
µ2µ1
W2
X(v)
λ2λ1
p(v)
W1(v)
1− p(v)
λ, F (v)
Fig. 1. System with a HBF server and a FIFO server.
where ρ denotes the traffic intensity, F (·) denotes the under-
lying distribution of β and W0 denotes the expected waiting
time in the HBF server added to that of an arriving customer
due to the residual service time of an existing customer. This
is given by,
W0 =
λ
2
∫
∞
0
τ2dG(µτ)
where λ and µ denote the arrival rate of customers and the
service rate of the HBF server respectively. It was further
shown that for a customer of type β, its expected waiting
time W (β) is given by
W (β) =
µ2W0
(µ− λ(1 − F (β)))2
. (2)
Now for a given p(β), it is easy to see that the arrival
rate to the FIFO server is λ2 := λ
∫
∞
0
p(β)dF (β) while
the arrival rate to the HBF server is λ1 := λ − λ2. Let
ρi := λi/µi. A customer of type β that chooses the HBF
server experiences a bid-dependent waiting time that will be
denoted by W1(β). The customers choosing the FIFO server
experience an expected waiting time denoted by W2(λ2).
Continuing with the notation of [3], let D1(β) := W1(β)+ 1µ1
and D2 := W2(λ2) + 1µ2 be the expected sojourn times in,
respectively, the HBF and the FIFO servers. Refer Fig. 1 for
an illustration of the system model.
In this paper, the primary interest is to obtain the equilibrium
strategy henceforth denoted by (pE(β), XE(β)). Note that
XE(β) needs to be determined for only those customers that
under equilibrium decide to join the HBF queue. Clearly, the
system considered is non-atomic and all customers choose
individually optimal strategies. The equilibrium attained is a
Wardrop equilibrium that was first described in [2] and used
extensively in transportation systems. The Wardrop equilib-
rium routing condition on pE(β) for all β is that
pE(β) ≥ 0 implies that c+ βD2 ≤ XE(β) + βD1(β).
(3)
3Further 0 < pE(β) < 1 implies c+βD2 = XE(β)+βD1(β).
The following theorem recalls the equilibrium strategy
(pE(β), XE(β)) for the system model considered in [3]. The
key difference between the models is that the FIFO server
in [3] charges no admission price and a customer joining the
HBF server is required to pay a minimum bid M.
Theorem 1: Using β1 determined below, define pE(β),
F1(β), and W0 as follows.
pE(β) =


0 for β > β1,
t for β = β1,
1 for β < β1.
(4)
F1(β) :=


0 β < β1∫
β
β1
dF (x)
∫
b
β1
dF (x)
β1 ≤ β ≤ b,
1 β > b,
(5)
W0 =
λ1
2
∫
∞
0
τ2dG(µ1τ), (6)
XE(β) =
∫ β
0
2ρ1W0y
(1− ρ1 + ρ1F1(y))
3 dF1(y) (7)
For the routing and bidding policy (pE(β), XE(β)), β1 is
determined as follows.
• If using β1 = a in (4)–(7) satisfies M + aD1(a) < aD2,
then set β1 = a.
• Else if using β1 = b in (4)–(7) satisfies M + bD1(b) >
bD2 then set β1 = b.
• Else find β1 ∈ (a, b) which when used in (4)–(7) satisfies
M + β1D1(β1) = β1D2. (8)
(pE(β), XE(β)) is an equilibrium strategy with β1 defined
as above. Further, β1 is unique. 
It is important to point out that the Wardrop condition for
the case with a minimum bid M > 0 and a free FIFO server
(c = 0) that is used in the above theorem is that
pE(β) ≥ 0, implies that βD2 ≤M +X(β) + βD1(β).
Remark 1: Note from the conditions for β1 that when β1 ∈
(a, b), the expected cost experienced by a customer with β =
β1 at the two servers is same and hence the value of t in Eq.
(4) is arbitrary. Also, F1(·) in the theorem corresponds to the
type profile of those customers that choose to join the HBF
server.
The above theorem determines the equilibrium routing and
bidding pair (pE(β), XE(β)) where pE(β) is characterized by
a unique threshold β1. It is natural therefore to ask whether
a similar single threshold routing equilibrium holds when
M = 0 and the FIFO server charges an admission price. This
question is analyzed in the next section.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we return to our main model and drop the
assumption of a free FIFO service and minimum bid M made
in [3]. To simplify the analysis and restrict the number of cases
arising due to the heterogeneity of servers, we shall henceforth
assume that µ1 = µ2 = µ, i.e., the servers are identical with
service rate µ. We shall further assume that c > 0 and that
the minimum bid M = 0.
A possible candidate for the Wardrop equilibrium routing
and bidding policy for this case is the one that was identified
in Theorem 1. Recall that such a policy was characterized by
a threshold β1 ∈ [a, b] and customers with β > β1 choose the
HBF server while those with β < β1 choose the FIFO server
at equilibrium. We begin the analysis of this section by first
investigating whether the routing and bidding policy pE(β)
and XE(β) as described in Eq. (4)–(7) of Theorem 1 holds
for some β1 ∈ [a, b]. In the following lemma, we will show
that when c > 0 and M = 0, pE(β) and XE(β) as described
in Eq. (4)–(7) with β1 ∈ (a, b] is not possible. Further if pE(β)
and XE(β) satisfy Eq. (4)–(7), then the underlying threshold
β1 must satisfy β1 = a, and the corresponding equilibrium
strategy for all customers is to choose the HBF server.
Lemma 1: Consider a routing and bidding policy
(pE(β), XE(β)) as described in Eq. (4)–(7) of Theorem
1 and assume that c > 0 and M = 0. Then such a
(pE(β), XE(β)) with β1 ∈ (a, b] and satisfying the Wardrop
equilibrium conditions of Eq. (3) does not exist.
Proof: We first prove that β1 /∈ (a, b) using contradiction.
Assume that when c > 0 and M = 0, the corresponding
(pE(β), XE(β)) satisfy Eq. (4)–(7) with β1 ∈ (a, b). Since
β1 ∈ (a, b), the equilibrium routing function pE(β) requires
that c + β1D2 = β1D1(β1). This implies that D2 < D1(β1)
and hence for any β < β1, we have
c = β1(D1(β1)−D2)
> β(D1(β1)−D2)
= β(D1(β) −D2). (9)
To see how the last equality is true, consider a customer
with β < β1 (that deviates from the prescribed pE(β)) and
chooses the HBF server instead of the FIFO server. Note
from the definition of F1(·) and XE(·) in Eq. (11) Eq. (7)
respectively that XE(β1) = 0. Using the property from [3],
[4] that XE(β) is increasing in β and the fact that the β
customer is infinitesimal, we can conclude that XE(β) = 0.
The deviating β customer therefore does not pay a bid and will
occupy the end of the queue. The infinitesimal nature of this
customer does not affect the delay at any of the two servers
and hence for such a deviating customer with β < β1 we have
D1(β) = D1(β1). From Eq. (9), we have c+βD2 > βD1(β).
Thus for this customer, the cost at the FIFO queue is more than
the cost it would experience at the HBF server. This customer
has an incentive to deviate from pE(β) and hence pE(β) is
not an equilibrium for any β1 ∈ (a, b).
Now consider the case when β1 = b. This implies that
none of the customers choose the HBF server and we have
c+ βD2 < βD1(β) for all β. Note that since β1 = b, λ1 = 0
and hence if a customer of type β were to choose HBF, the
delay would have been D1(β) = 1µ . At the FIFO server, we
have λ2 = λ and hence D2 = 1µ−λ1 . Now β1 = b and hence
c + βD2 < βD1(β) implies that c + βµ−λ1 <
β
µ
for all β.
However this is not possible for any β as c > 0 and 1
µ−λ1
> 1
µ
.
Next, we outline the conditions on the parameters for β1 =
4a. From the definition of pE(β), this corresponds to the case
when none of the customers choose the FIFO server i.e., when
c+ βD2 > X(β) + βD1(β) for all β. It is straightforward to
see that this case is possible when c is set to any arbitrarily
large value such that for all β we have c + βD2 > X(β) +
βD1(β). This completes the proof.
An alternative candidate for the equilibrium routing and
bidding policy is as follows.
pˆ(β) =


1 for β > β1,
t for β = β1,
0 for β < β1.
(10)
with the threshold β1 ∈ (a, b) and the corresponding
distribution F1(β) satisfying
F1(β) :=


0 β < a∫
β
a
dF (x)∫
β1
a
dF (x)
a ≤ β ≤ β1,
1 β > β1.
(11)
It is easy to see that pˆ(β) for β1 = a ( resp. b) is equal to
pE(β) (Eq. (4)) with β1 = b ( resp. a) and the conditions for
such equilibria with β1 = a ( or b) is already outlined in the
previous lemma. In the following lemma, we shall now show
that when c > 0 and M = 0, a routing equilibrium satisfying
Eq. (10) with β1 ∈ (a, b) is not possible.
Lemma 2: Let c > 0,M = 0 and consider a routing policy
that satisfies Eq. (10) with β ∈ (a, b) and has the type profile of
customers to the HBF server given by Eq. (11). Such a routing
policy does not satisfy the Wardrop equilibrium conditions of
Eq. (3).
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose pˆ(β) as in
Eq. (10) satisfies the conditions of Eq. (3). Since β ∈ (a, b),
we have
c+ β1D2 = X(β1) + β1D1(β1).
Now since X(β) is increasing in β and all customers with
β < β1 choose the HBF server, we have X(β1) > 0 and
D1(β1) =
1
µ
. Further, λ2 > 0 implies D2 > 1µ = D1(β1)
and hence X(β1) > c. For β > β1, we therefore have the
following.
X(β1)− c = β1
(
D2 −
1
µ
)
< β
(
D2 −
1
µ
)
.
Thus for any customer with β > β1 we have
X(β1) +
β
µ
< c+ βD2. (12)
Now consider a customer with β > β1 that deviates from pˆ(β)
and chooses the HBF server instead of the FIFO server. The
bid paid by this marginal customer is X(β) = X(β1) resulting
in D1(β) = 1µ . From Eq. (12), the cost at the HBF server for
such a customer (X(β1)+ βµ ) is lower than the corresponding
cost (c+βD2) at the FIFO server. This customer now has an
incentive to deviate and the therefore the routing policy pˆ(β)
of Eq. (10) is not an equilibrium policy.
We now come to the main result of this section. Having
discarded two candidate policies, we shall provide the routing
and bidding policy satisfying the Wardrop equilibrium condi-
tion of Eq. (3). As we shall show in the following theorem, this
policy is characterized by two thresholds β1 and β2 that satisfy
a < β1 < β2 < b. In this policy, customers with β satisfying
β1 < β < β2 choose the FIFO server while the rest choose
the HBF server. We will also characterize the conditions for
such an equilibrium policy in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let β1 and β2 be two thresholds satisfying the
conditions outlined below. Define pE(β), F1(β), and W0 as
follows.
pE(β) =


1 for β1 < β < β2,
t for β ∈ {β1, β2},
0 elsewhere .
(13)
F1(β) :=


∫
β
a
dF (x)(
1−
∫ β2
β1
dF (x)
) β < β1
∫
β1
a
dF (x)(
1−
∫ β2
β1
dF (x)
) β1 ≤ β ≤ β2,
∫
β1
a
dF (x)+
∫
β
β2
dF (x)(
1−
∫ β2
β1
dF (x)
) β2 < β ≤ b,
1 β > b,
(14)
W0 =
λ1
2
∫
∞
0
τ2dG(µτ), (15)
XE(β) =
∫ β
0
2ρ1W0y
(1− ρ1 + ρ1F1(y))
3 dF1(y) (16)
The conditions that need to be satisfied by β1 and β2 are
as follows.
1) a < β1 < β2 < b.
2) XE(β1) = c.
3) XE(β1) + β1D1(β1) = c + β1D2(λ2) where λ2 =∫ β2
β1
λdF (x).
Then, (pE(β), XE(β)) is an equilibrium strategy satisfying
the Wardrop conditions of Eq. (3).
Proof: As in the case of Theorem 1, we will prove
that pE(β) and XE(β) as described in (13)–(16) satisfy the
Wardrop condition. Note that with pE(β) as in (13), the arrival
rate to the FIFO server is λ2 = λ
∫ β2
β1
dF (τ). The arrival rate
to the HBF server is λ−λ2 and the type profile of customers
choosing this server will be as in Eq. (14). As in Theorem 1,
customers that join the HBF server will use the equilibrium
bidding policy of Eq. (16). We will now verify that pE(β) of
(13) satisfies the corresponding Wardrop condition.
First note that second and third conditions of the theorem
imply that D1(β1) = D2(λ2). Further, since F1(β) is a
constant for β ∈ (β1, β2), we have X(β1) = X(β2) and
D1(β1) = D1(β2). Now consider a customer with β < β1
that chooses the HBF server for the routing policy of Eq. (13).
For this customer, we know from (3) in Property 1 of [3] that
X(β) is the optimal bid minimizing its individual cost i.e.,
X(β) + βD1(β) < X(β1) + βD1(β1).
This implies that
X(β) + βD1(β) < c+ βD2(λ2)
5and hence any customer with β < β1 has no incentive to
choose the FIFO server. Similarly, for a customer with β > β2
we have
X(β) + βD1(β) < X(β2) + βD1(β2)
= c+ βD2(λ2)
and clearly customers with β > β2 have no incentive to choose
the FIFO server.
Now consider any customer with β ∈ (β1, β2). If such
a customer were to choose the HBF server instead of the
prescribed FIFO server, its cost at the HBF server will be
X(β1)+βD1(β1). This follows from (1) and (3) of Property 1
in [3] and the fact that a deviation by a marginal customer does
not change Eq. (13) and (14) due to the absolute continuity
of F. Now X(β1) + βD1(β1) = c + βD2(λ2), i.e., the cost
at the two server is the same and there is no incentive for
this customer to deviate from pE(β) given by Eq. (13). This
completes the proof.
Remark 2: In the above discussion, we have assumed c > 0
and M = 0. W.l.o.g the observations are true even for the
case when c > M and M 6= 0. For this case, let cˆ = c−M.
The above theorem and the previous lemmas will hold with c
being replaced by cˆ. It is easy to see that the case c < M and
M 6= 0 corresponds to the Wardrop equilibrium as described
in Theorem 1.
We now provide an example to verify the claim in the above
theorem.
Example: Consider an HBF and FIFO server with identical
service rates µ = 5. The arrival rate for the customers is λ = 4.
F (·) is a uniform distribution with support [a, b] where a = 0
and b = 10. Now suppose that the admission price at the FIFO
server is c = 0.2017. Assume that the service requirement of
all customers is identical with an exponential distribution of
unit mean. For a system with the specified parameters, the
interest is to characterize the Wardrop equilibrium routing
function. It can be numerically verified that corresponding
pE(β) is characterized by the two thresholds β1 = 1.67 and
β2 = 5.66. With these thresholds, the corresponding arrival
rates to the two servers are λ1 = 1.596 and λ2 = 3.404. Due
to the exponential service requirement, it is easy to see that
D2 =
1
µ−λ1
= 0.2938. From the definition of W0 and Eq.
(2), the expected waiting time of customers in HBF queue
expressed as a function of β is
W1(β) =
1
(µ− λ(1− F1(β)))2
.
It can be verified that the value of D2(β1) = W1(β1) + 1µ =
0.2938. Further, evaluating XE(β1) using Eq. (16) gives us
XE(β1) = c = 0.2017. Clearly, all the three conditions are
satisfied by the choice of β1 and β2 validating the theorem.
IV. DISCUSSION
The present work characterizes a two threshold equilibrium
when the service system has parallel FIFO and HBF servers.
It should be noted that our analysis holds not only in the
case of the FIFO scheduling policy but also for policies such
as processor sharing or last-in, first-out (LCFS) or any other
policy that does not differentiate between its customers on the
basis of their β. As in [3], the application for this model can
be in the form of a new pricing and auction mechanism in on-
demand resource provisioning, e.g., cloud computing systems.
Some interesting extensions present themselves. If the two
servers belong to the same system operator, it would be
interesting to know the revenue maximizing admission price
c at the FIFO server. On the other hand, if the FIFO server is
perceived as a competing system, then the revenue optimal c
obtained in this case would certainly be different.
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